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3.1 Introduction
Recent years have seen the development of a large literature on balance
sheet factors in ﬁnancial crises.1The balance sheet approach focuses on the
impact of disturbances on the assets, liabilities, and net worth of house-
holds, ﬁrms, government, and the economy as a whole and on the implica-
tions for growth and stability. Some studies focus on the net worth eﬀects
of shocks to the exchange rate in the presence of foreign currency–denom-
inated liabilities. Others look at liquidity or interest rate shocks when the
tenor of a bank, ﬁrm, or country’s liabilities is shorter than the tenor of its
assets. In some studies the propagation mechanism is the impact on con-
sumption and investment of the change in net worth of households and
nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. In others it is the impact on the liquidity and solvency
of ﬁnancial institutions and markets and hence on conﬁdence in the ﬁnan-
cial system. In still others it is the impact on the sustainability of the public
debt.
Recent contributions also diﬀer in their assumptions about the distor-
tion giving rise to these fragilities. Our own work focuses on problems with
the structure of global ﬁnancial markets that result in the inability of econ-
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1. See, for example, Krugman (1999), Razin and Sadka (1999), Aghion, Bacchetta, and
Banerjee (2000), Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2002), and Jeanne (2002).omies to borrow abroad in their own currencies.2 Others focus on policy
failures as a result of which governments fail to limit foreign currency and
short-maturity borrowing to socially desirable levels and/or fail to insure
adequately against its potentially destabilizing consequences.3
Hence, while all of these studies are concerned in a broad sense with
open-economy balance sheet eﬀects, the issues on which they focus are not
the same. These diﬀerent emphases lead to diﬀerent perspectives on re-
search and policy.
In section 3.2 we introduce several concepts that are widely used in the
literature, describe how they diﬀer, and explain why these diﬀerences mat-
ter. We distinguish between currency mismatches (diﬀerences in the cur-
rencies in which assets and liabilities are denominated), debt intolerance
(the inability of emerging markets to manage levels of debt that are man-
ageable for advanced industrial countries), and original sin (the diﬃculty
emerging markets face when attempting to borrow abroad in their own cur-
rencies). We emphasize that the phenomena denoted by these terms are
analytically distinct.
In section 3.3 we show that these distinctions matter empirically as well
as conceptually. We analyze the impact of balance sheet variables on the
volatility of output, the volatility of capital ﬂows, the management of ex-
change rates, and creditworthiness of countries. We show that it is impor-
tant when considering the behavior of such variables to clearly distinguish
original sin, debt intolerance, and currency mismatches. Section 3.4 ad-
dresses a number of additional debates that have arisen in this context, af-
ter which section 3.5 summarizes our conclusions.
3.2 Currency Mismatches, Debt Intolerance, 
and Original Sin Are Not the Same
Three terms that are prevalent in this literature—currency mismatches,
debt intolerance, and original sin—in fact refer to quite diﬀerent phenom-
ena.
3.2.1 Original Sin
Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2005b) deﬁne original sin as the
inability of a country to borrow abroad in its owncurrency.4This focus on ex-
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2. See Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) and Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza
(2005b).
3. See, for example, Goldstein and Turner (2004) and Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano
(2003).
4. In earlier work, Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) used the term to refer to both the
diﬃculty that countries experience when attempting to borrow abroad in their own curren-
cies and the diﬃculty they face when attempting to borrow at home at long maturities. In sub-
sequent work we came to conclude that the ﬁrst of these two problems is particularly diﬃcult.
While it is not easy to develop domestic bond markets—something that is the sine qua non ofternal borrowing is motivated by the observation that, in the absence of
other distortions, world welfare would be enhanced if capital ﬂowed from
capital-rich advanced countries to their more capital-poor emerging mar-
ket counterparts. It would be further enhanced if countries could use the
current account and the capital ﬂows needed to ﬁnance it to stabilize the
domestic economy when faced with shocks.5
One possible explanation for the failure of more capital to ﬂow from rich
to poor countries and the diﬃculty experienced by the latter in using the
capital account to smooth consumption is their inability to borrow abroad
in their own currencies. If a country’s external debt is denominated in for-
eign currency, then real exchange rate depreciation, by reducing the pur-
chasing power of domestic output over foreign claims, will make it more
diﬃcult to service that debt. Knowing that shocks aﬀecting the real ex-
change rate can disrupt the country’s ability to service its debt, foreigners
may be rendered less willing to lend. And since the real exchange rate tends
to strengthen in good times and weaken in bad times, foreign currency debt
will be harder to service in bad times, reducing willingness to lend and
thereby accentuating the procyclical nature of capital ﬂows.
Aware of these dangers, a government may use macroeconomic and reg-
ulatory policies to limit foreign borrowing. But then capital still will not
ﬂow from capital-rich to capital-poor countries, nor will countries be able
to cushion the eﬀect of shocks through international borrowing. The gov-
ernment may accumulate foreign reserves to be used to intervene in the for-
eign exchange market in order to prevent the currency from moving and/or
to enable it to act as debt servicer of last resort. But in this case, the coun-
try’s gross foreign currency liabilities, accumulated by borrowing abroad,
are matched by gross foreign currency assets that the government holds in
the form of international reserves. If reserves equal gross foreign borrow-
ing, then there will again be no capital transfer from capital-rich to capital-
poor economies.
In part, debate on these questions revolves around the validity of the
premise that other distortions are absent or at least that they are not the
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facilitating the eﬀorts of ﬁrms and governments to borrow at home at long maturities—a
growing number of countries are showing an ability to do so. Chile, Hungary, India, and Thai-
land, among other countries, are able to borrow on domestic markets at ﬁxed rates without
indexing their bonds to the exchange rate, as documented in section 3.4. But these same coun-
tries are making less progress in developing the ability to borrow abroad in their own curren-
cies. In Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2005b) we have also devoted some attention
to “the domestic aspect” of original sin. But because the constraints on borrowing abroad in
one’s own currency seem particularly intractable, we have made this the focus of our recent
work and adopted a correspondingly narrower deﬁnition of original sin. We return to these
issues in section 3.4.
5. That net capital ﬂows from relatively capital-rich to relatively capital-poor countries are
not larger is referred to as the “Lucas paradox” (after Lucas 1990). That capital ﬂows are pro-
cyclical, exacerbating booms and recessions, has also been widely commented upon (see, e.g.,
Gavin, Hausmann, and Leiderman 1995).main thing going on. A contrary view is that the inability of emerging mar-
kets to borrow abroad in their own currencies is simply a corollary of other
distortions to their economies that remove the incentive for lending and
borrowing. Weak policies and institutions in emerging markets so depress
the marginal productivity of capital, in this view, that neither the welfare of
these countries, nor that of the world as a whole, is enhanced by capital
transfer. Foreigners are not inclined to invest in emerging markets, in this
view, because productivity there is so low.
The intermediate position is that domestic policies and institutions are
important for the ability of countries to borrow abroad in their own cur-
rencies, but so are factors largely beyond the control of the individual
country.6Foreign investors may be reluctant to lend to a country in its own
currency if the authorities are prone to manipulating the value of that cur-
rency. Institutional and policy reforms giving investors conﬁdence that the
value of the currency will be maintained may thus be necessary for a coun-
try to be able to borrow abroad in its own currency. But the evidence does
not suggest that they are suﬃcient; too many countries with strong policies
and institutions also suﬀer from original sin. Moreover, if the problem was
fear of inﬂation, we should observe inﬂation-indexed local currency debts
or contracts in the currencies of a variety of well-behaved countries. In-
stead, we observe a large concentration of debt denominated in a few ma-
jor currencies.7
Chile is a favorite example of a country with increasingly strong institu-
tions and policies. In terms of rule of law, the International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG) gave Chile 5 of 6 possible points in 2001, compared to a
Latin American average of 2.9 and a world average of 3.8. Chile has also
done a good job of managing the risks associated with foreign borrowing,
using capital account regulation, prudential supervision, transparency re-
quirements for banks and ﬁrms, and ﬂexible exchange rates to encourage
prudent management of foreign currency exposures.8
One thing that these strengthened policies and institutions have not
done, however, is to enable Chile to borrow abroad in its own currency. The
consequences have been signiﬁcant. In 1998 Chile was hit by an adverse
124 Barry Eichengreen, Ricardo Hausmann, and Ugo Panizza
6. This is a fair summary of our view.
7. Of the nearly $5.8 trillion in outstanding securities placed in international markets in the
period 1999–2001, $5.6 trillion was issued in ﬁve major currencies: the U.S. dollar, the euro,
the yen, the pound sterling, and the Swiss franc. See Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza
(2005b). To be sure, the residents of the countries issuing these currencies (or, in the case of
Euroland, the group of countries) constitute a signiﬁcant portion of the world economy and
hence form a signiﬁcant part of global debt issuance. But while residents of these countries is-
sued $4.5 trillion of debt over this period, the remaining $1.1 trillion of debt denominated in
their currencies was issued by residents of other countries and by international organizations
(which issued a total of $1.3 trillion of debt). The causes and consequences of this concentra-
tion of debt denomination in few currencies are the focus of the literature on original sin.
8. These policies are a reasonable approximation of the emerging consensus on how a pru-
dent emerging market should manage the risks of external borrowing.terms-of-trade shock. A country able to borrow abroad in its own currency,
when hit by this temporary shock, would have eased monetary and ﬁscal
policies, loosened the exchange rate, and ﬁnanced its growing external
deﬁcit by borrowing abroad in order to smooth consumption and stabilize
production. This is what Australia did, for example, when hit by the same
global shock.9But Chile, rather than seeing capital inﬂows buﬀer its export
shock, suﬀered a sudden stop in such ﬂows, forcing it to cut its imports by
fully 22 percent (nearly 6 percent of gross domestic product [GDP]) be-
tween 1997 and 1999. This entailed a collapse in GDP growth from 6.8 per-
cent in 1997 to –0.8 percent in 1999.10 These are large swings by the stan-
dards of the advanced industrial economies.
Why did Chile’s performance resemble that of Latin American countries
plagued by weak institutions rather than that of advanced countries with
comparable institutional-quality ratings, like Australia? Original sin may
be part of the answer. If Chile had pursued accommodative policies and al-
lowed the real exchange rate to adjust, adverse balance sheet eﬀects would
have created doubts about its ability to service its debt, limiting the will-
ingness of the foreign investors to fund the ensuing deﬁcit. By opting for
restrictive policies, the authorities curtailed the demand for foreign ﬁnance
so as to limit the increase in country risk, but at the cost of a major reces-
sion.11
The Chilean authorities were not unaware of these dangers, but the ex
ante policies available to limit the country’s vulnerability to sudden stops
had costs as well. Gallego and Hernandez (2003) show that the non-
interest-bearing deposit requirement imposed on foreign borrowing in the
1990s increased the cost of external ﬁnance for Chilean ﬁrms. This does not
mean that these policies were inadvisable; we have argued elsewhere that
such costs were worth paying.12 In eﬀect they were optimal second-best
policies—they were a sensible way of insuring against the risk of sudden
stops given that external debt was denominated in foreign currency. But the
distance to the ﬁrst best was substantial because the policies in question
entailed a trade-oﬀbetween access to external ﬁnance on the one hand and
ﬁnancial stability on the other. Chile was able to attain a reasonable posi-
tion on this frontier owing to the strength of its policies and institutions.
Even better, of course, would have been the ability to push that frontier
outward by acquiring the ability to borrow abroad in local currency.
Currency Mismatches, Debt Intolerance, and Original Sin 125
9. This is the counterexample considered in Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999). This com-
parison is pursued by Caballero, Cowan, and Kearns (2003), whose interpretation diﬀers.
10. Calculations based on data for imports and GDP from the Central Bank of Chile. For
a discussion of the costs of sudden stop in capital ﬂows see Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2002).
11. After 2000 and especially after 2002, policies became more accommodative and the real
exchange rate was allowed to depreciate by 38.6 percent from its peak in 1997. However, cap-
ital inﬂows have yet to resume and growth has remained lackluster, as would be expected
given the less expansionary eﬀect of depreciations in countries that suﬀer from original sin.
12. See Hausmann and Gavin (1996) and Eichengreen (2002).It is striking in this context that Chile, despite the strength of its institu-
tions, has been unable to escape the problem of original sin that was a con-
straint on shifting that frontier. This is a speciﬁc example of the general
point that the standard institution-strengthening measures appear to have
relatively little ability over policy-relevant horizons to enable developing
countries to acquire the capacity to borrow abroad in their own curren-
cies.13 The label “original sin” is designed to convey the possibility that the
problem may not result only from the actions of the aﬀected country but in
addition may have something to do with factors largely beyond its imme-
diate determination and control.14
3.2.2 Debt Intolerance
Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano (2003) deﬁne debt intolerance as the
inability of emerging markets to manage levels of external debt that are man-
ageable for advanced countries. They operationalize the concept as the re-
lationship between a country’s credit rating (also referred to as country
risk) and its external debt. They report that ratings fall more rapidly with
debt in emerging markets than advanced countries, as if the former have
less debt management capacity.
Debt intolerance and original sin are not the same. The inability of a
country to borrow abroad in its own currency is one potential explanation
for why it may have trouble managing levels of debt that would be man-
ageable for other countries. But no one to our knowledge has claimed that
original sin is the only determinant of debt problems.15
Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano (2003) write that “a country’s external
debt intolerance can be explained by a very small number of variables re-
lated to its repayment history.” They show that countries that defaulted in
the past and have histories of inﬂation have lower credit ratings in the pres-
ent. We endorse the insight that history can play an important role in shap-
ing current outcomes. But a minimal condition for a theory of the histori-
cal determinants of current events is a transmission mechanism through
which events in the past can inﬂuence outcomes in the present.16 One
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13. See section 3.3 for additional evidence.
14. We will have more to say about the speciﬁc nature of these factors below.
15. This point would not be worth making except that some contributors to the literature
have referred interchangeably to countries’ external debt problems in general (their “country
risk” or “debt intolerance”) and their inability to borrow abroad in their own currencies in
particular (“original sin”). In our previous work and again below, we analyze the determi-
nants of a country’s debt problems, as measured by their credit ratings. We study the impact
of original sin on credit ratings, controlling for several other potential determinants of ratings
such as a country’s per capita income and its overall indebtedness. This makes clear that we
do not see original sin as the only determinant of country risk, although we do ﬁnd that it is
an important determinant.
16. There is now a large literature on this subject. See the discussion in David (2001). We
endorse Joshua Aizenman’s conjecture, in his comment on the present paper, that a history of
macroeconomic and ﬁnancial instability may weaken the social contract and impact in-would also want evidence that this mechanism is at work, for otherwise one
could not rule out that omitted factors associated with external debt–
servicing diﬃculties in both the past and present explain the observed cor-
relation, where in fact there is no causal mechanism linking past events to
current outcomes.
Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano (2003) conjecture that default on exter-
nal debt may weaken a country’s ﬁnancial system and that a weaker ﬁnan-
cial system increases the likelihood of subsequent default because countries
with weaker ﬁnancial systems suﬀer larger output losses when access to ex-
ternal ﬁnance is interrupted. They suggest that default on external debt may
weaken a country’s tax system by encouraging capital ﬂight and tax avoid-
ance, in turn making it harder to raise the revenues needed to service public
debts. But they report no regressions relating the size of the ﬁnancial system
and the tax base to countries’ histories of default, and no regressions relat-
ing current default to the size of the ﬁnancial system and the tax base. They
present no evidence of these or other mechanisms causally linking past de-
faults to current debt-servicing diﬃculties.17
That the same countries have defaulted in both the distant and the more
recent past may in fact reﬂect other characteristics of those countries that
are slow to change but that are omitted from this analysis of debt intoler-
ance. Original sin may be one such characteristic. Elsewhere we have
shown that the inability of countries to borrow abroad in their own cur-
rencies is persistent.18 Similarly, that the commodity composition of ex-
ports renders some countries’ terms of trade persistently more volatile
than others may explain why some countries have more diﬃculty than oth-
ers in coping with external debt.19
Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano (2003) regress credit ratings as a mea-
sure of debt-servicing prospects on the history of debt and inﬂation, using
data for ﬁfty-three advanced and developing countries. To determine
whether developing countries are less able to manage debts that are man-
ageable for advanced economies, they enter the ratio of debt to gross na-
tional product (GNP) separately for countries with high credit ratings
(67.7 and above on the Institutional Investor100-point scale) and low credit
ratings (below 67.7).20 In support of their hypothesis, they point to the fact
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vestors’ attitudes regarding a country’s ability to service debts. But these ideas are not made
explicit in the literature on debt intolerance.
17. In principle, empirical work along these lines should be feasible. We return to this in the
concluding section of our paper.
18. Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2005a) use the measures of original sin circa
1850 constructed by Flandreau and Sussman (2005) to document the correlation between
original sin then and now.
19. Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson (2003) suggest that the commodity composition of
exports and the resulting behavior of the real exchange rate have persistent implications for
volatility and growth.
20. Some of their regressions also include the percentage of sample years in which the debt
was in default or restructuring.that the coeﬃcient on the debt-GNP ratio is negative for countries with low
ratings and positive for countries with high ratings and to the high R2of the
regression.
We see three problems with this analysis. First is the omitted-variables
problem described above.21 Second, credit ratings appear on both sides of
this equation, as a continuous variable on the left and a dummy for above
or below 67.7 on the right (interacted with the debt ratio). This makes it
hard to draw much comfort from the high R2. Third, there is no separate in-
tercept for countries with credit ratings below 67.7. Hence, all respects in
which countries with low credit ratings diﬀer from countries with high
credit ratings are loaded into the interaction term between credit ratings
and the debt-GNP ratio.
In table 3.1 we show the diﬀerence that this makes. The ﬁrst regression
relates credit ratings to debt-GDP separately for advanced and developing
countries but does not include a separate intercept for the latter. Here we
use Standard & Poor’s (S&P) rating data instead of those from Institutional
Investor in order to preserve comparability with our previous work and
further results reported below.22 Despite using slightly diﬀerent country
samples and data, we obtain the same result as Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and
Savastano (2003)—namely, that the coeﬃcient on the debt ratio is signiﬁ-
cantly larger for developing countries.23 The second regression then shows
that this result evaporates when a separate intercept is included.
In equation (3), we split the sample not into advanced and developing
countries but into countries with high and low credit ratings, following
Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano (2003). We generate a dummy variable
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21. To put the same point another way, the authors put a structural interpretation on an ex-
tremely reduced-form relationship.
22. Our rating variable is from S&P and ranges between 0 and 19. (We converted the S&P
rating into a numerical variable by adopting the following criteria: selective default   0, C  
2, CC   2.5, CCC   3, B–   4, and each extra upgrade   one point. A value of 19 corre-
sponds to AAA.) We also adjust our classiﬁcation for the outlook assigned by S&P to each
country, and we increase the rating by 0.33 when the country has a positive outlook and de-
crease the rating by 0.33 when the country has a negative outlook. The rating variable used by
Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano is from Institutional Investor and ranges from 0 to 100. We
report regressions using this alternative measure below.
23. There are two additional diﬀerences between these regressions and the ones in Rein-
hart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano (2003). First, since our rating variable is censored at 19 (and more
than 10 percent of observations are at the upper bound), we use a Tobit model instead of or-
dinary least squares (OLS). The results are robust to estimating these equations by OLS in-
stead of Tobit. Second, we use averages over the 1993–99 period, while Reinhart et al. use av-
erages for the 1979–2002 period. Finally, while the two samples have similar size (sixty-two
countries in our sample, ﬁfty-three in Reinhart et al.), they do not overlap perfectly. We do
not know exactly which countries are included in the Reinhart et al. regressions. However, in
appendix B1 of their paper, they list sixty-three countries for which they have information on
credit rating. Presumably the ﬁfty-three countries included in the regressions are a subset of
this sample. There are twenty-three countries that are included in our sample but not in table
B1 of Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano, and twenty-four countries included in their table B1
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.that takes value 1 if a given country has a rating above the mean plus 1 stan-
dard deviation of our cross-country sample.24Column (3) reproduces their
result: the coeﬃcients on the debt ratios for high- and low-rated countries
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one another at standard conﬁdence levels.25
But when in column (4) we allow the two groups of countries to have a
diﬀerent intercept, the point estimate and the statistical signiﬁcance of the
diﬀerence in slope coeﬃcients again collapse.
In the last three columns of the table we replace the Standard & Poor’s
rating variable used in the ﬁrst four columns with the Institutional Investor
rating (which varies from 0 to 100) used by Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savas-
tano (2003). When we intersect the Institutional Investor rating with the
sample of countries for which we have information on debt relative to GDP
we are left with a sample of forty-ﬁve countries. We separate the sample
into countries with high and low credit ratings using the same threshold
used by Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano (67.7). Column (5) reproduces
their result: the eﬀect of debt-GDP is positive and signiﬁcant in countries
with high credit ratings and negative and signiﬁcant in countries with low
credit ratings. The diﬀerence between the two groups is also statistically
signiﬁcant. In column (6), we allow the two groups of countries to have
diﬀerent intercepts and ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients of debt over GDP are no
longer signiﬁcant in either group of countries.26 Furthermore, the diﬀer-
ence between the two coeﬃcients is no longer signiﬁcant at conventional
conﬁdence levels. The results are also sensitive to the inclusion of an out-
lier, South Korea, which has relatively low levels of debt and a high credit
rating. If Korea is dropped (column [7]), the diﬀerence between the coeﬃ-
cients of high- and low-rated countries declines still further.27
3.2.3 Currency Mismatch
Original sin also diﬀers from currency mismatches, deﬁned as diﬀerences
in the values of the foreign currency–denominated assets and liabilities on the
balance sheets of households, ﬁrms, the government, and the economy as a
whole. In the case of a bank, the concept of a currency mismatch is famil-
iar: it is the diﬀerence between the value of the foreign currency–denomi-
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24. Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano also separate their sample at the mean plus 1 standard
deviation. On our numerical scale, this corresponds to a cutoﬀ of 16.
25. That the results are very similar to the preceding set of regressions is not surprising.
Only two countries that we classify as advanced have low ratings (Greece and Iceland), while
just one country that we classify as developing has a high rating (Singapore).
26. The point estimates are also very diﬀerent from those in the regressions omitting the ad-
ditional intercept term.
27. If panel data methods are used instead of simple cross-country comparisons, the diﬀer-
ence between the coeﬃcients of high-rating and low-rating countries also remains statistically
signiﬁcant after controlling for country ﬁxed eﬀects. Fixed eﬀect estimates may however be
problematic (they amplify the ratio of noise to signal) in a setting where the ﬁxed eﬀects ex-
plain 90 percent of the variance of the dependent variable and 80 percent of the variance of
the explanatory variable.nated liabilities and assets (typically normalized by total assets, total do-
mestic currency assets, or another appropriate scale variable). For a ﬁrm,
the currency mismatch derives from the relationship between net foreign
currency–denominated liabilities and the net present value of domestic
currency–denominated cash ﬂow. A ﬁrm with a currency mismatch will ex-
perience an adverse balance sheet eﬀect if exchange rate depreciation raises
the value of its net foreign currency–denominated liabilities relative to the
net present value of its cash ﬂow.28
When we aggregate this up to the national level, consolidating the for-
eign currency assets and liabilities of residents, we are left with the aggre-
gate currency mismatch. This means that there will be an aggregate cur-
rency mismatch when there is a net debt to foreigners denominated in
foreign currency. The implications for the country then parallel those for
the ﬁrm: real exchange rate depreciation that raises the value of a country’s
external net debt in terms of the value of its national output will create ad-
verse balance sheet eﬀects.
However, the aggregate mismatch that exists when there is a net debt to
foreigners denominated in foreign currency is diﬀerent from original sin,
deﬁned as the inability of a country to borrow abroad in its own currency
and measured as the ratio of foreign currency–denominated gross debt to
foreigners as a share of total gross debt to foreigners. By deﬁnition, when
banks, ﬁrms, or public agencies of a country suﬀering from original sin
borrow abroad, they incur a gross foreign debt denominated in foreign cur-
rency. But the country may or may not also incur a currency mismatch, de-
pending on how the authorities respond to that act of borrowing. One con-
sequence of original sin is the tendency for countries aﬄicted by this
problem to accumulate international reserves as a way of protecting them-
selves from potentially destabilizing ﬁnancial consequences. We show in
section 3.3 that countries with high levels of original sin do in fact hold sig-
niﬁcantly larger international reserves, other things being equal.
But where reserve accumulation is large, currency mismatches will be
small. Thus, where an aggregate mismatch is one possible consequence of
original sin, it is not a necessary one. While one possible consequence of
original sin is a currency mismatch, another possible consequence is a large
reserve accumulation. Either, or to some extent both, may occur.
Currency mismatches may have costs. But large reserve holdings may
also have costs, since the yield on reserves is typically less than the cost of
funds. If governments settle on an interior solution to their optimization
problem, they are likely to accumulate reserves that oﬀset some fraction
less than one of gross foreign debt denominated in foreign currency. The re-
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28. If depreciation is fully translated into higher prices for ﬁrms’ output, as would happen
with a small exporting ﬁrm or when there is a full pass-through of exchange rates into prices,
there will be no change in the net worth of a company. But this is not the general case.sulting currency mismatch will be smaller than the gross debt denominated
in foreign currency, while reserve holdings will be larger than in a country
that can borrow in domestic currency terms.
It thus makes no sense to criticize measures of original sin as poor mea-
sures of aggregate currency mismatches. Authors concerned with the two
concepts are attempting to measure diﬀerent things.
Currency mismatches may have other causes besides original sin. If
banks are undercapitalized, with weak risk management and inadequate
prudential supervision, moral hazard may tempt banks to fund themselves
in foreign currency at low interest rates and on-lend in domestic currency
at high rates, ignoring the fact that they incur a currency mismatch that
leaves them vulnerable to exchange rate ﬂuctuations.29 Or a government
may neglect the need to accumulate reserves as insurance against exchange
rate shocks when foreign debt is denominated in foreign currency terms. Or
the authorities may mislead banks and ﬁrms into believing that the ex-
change rate will remain pegged forever, encouraging them to underesti-
mate exchange risk and hence the danger of open positions in foreign cur-
rency. Original sin may result in mismatches, depending on how the
authorities manage its consequences. But we have never suggested that
only original sin matters for currency mismatches, as is asserted in some
discussions of our work.
Nor have we asserted that the strength of a country’s institutions and
policies is irrelevant for managing the consequences of original sin. In par-
ticular, countries with strong institutions, capable of running strong poli-
cies, are in the best position to cope with the potential mismatch problem.
They can accumulate reserves. They can limit foreign borrowing. They can
operate more ﬂexible exchange rates. All of these steps may help to limit
currency mismatches and ﬁnancial fragility.30 But these measures are sec-
ond best. The ﬁrst best would involve having the capacity to borrow from
foreigners without incurring a currency mismatch.
This is just another way of saying that the measures that countries use to
insure against mismatches are not without cost. Limiting access to foreign
borrowing may limit investment. Reserve accumulation is costly. Flexible
exchange rates are more problematic in countries with large shares of
foreign currency–denominated debt. Thus, measures to limit the conse-
quences of original sin taken by countries with the institutional capacity to
implement them may come at a cost, as discussed above. This is the sense
in which such measures may be incompletely successful at reconciling
growth and stability.
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29. This is an element of Goldstein’s (1998) analysis of the Asian crisis.
30. Thus, where previous authors have said that in empirical work like that presented be-
low we minimize the importance of macroeconomic and prudential policies for currency mis-
matches, they are confusing currency mismatches with original sin.3.3 How These Diﬀerences Matter in Practice
We now show that these distinctions matter in practice. We start by con-
structing measures of original sin and presenting evidence of its conse-
quences for policy, the volatility of growth and capital ﬂows, and country
creditworthiness.31 We then repeat the exercise adding measures of aggre-
gate currency mismatches and debt intolerance. The results suggest that
the eﬀects of original sin are the more statistically robust than those of
these alternative concepts.
3.3.1 Original Sin
Our index of original sin is32
(1) OSINi   max 1   , 0 
The numerator includes all securities issued in currency i regardless of the
nationality of the issuer. We adopt this formulation because if residents of
countries diﬀerent from i issue bonds in currency i, these bonds can then
be used by residents of country i to swap their foreign currency obligations
into domestic currency obligations. This opportunity to hedge would not
be captured by an index that only includes local currency debt issued by
residents. Although (Securities in currency i/Securities issued by country i)
can be greater than 1 (for countries that issue currencies that are widely
used by nonresidents), we bound OSIN at zero because countries cannot
hedge more debt than they have.
This index includes bonded international debt but does not include
cross-border bank loans, since the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) does not provide detailed currency breakdowns of international
loans.33We therefore weight each observation in the regression analysis be-
low by the share of securities in total foreign debt.34
Table 3.2 presents simple averages of OSIN for several groups of coun-
tries. The ﬁnancial centers (United States, United Kingdom, Switzerland,
and Japan) have the lowest levels of original sin (in an obvious sense since
this is what deﬁnes them as ﬁnancial centers). They are followed by the
Euroland countries. Evidently, the advent of the euro (whose introduction
provides the dividing point between the two periods in the table) led to a
Securities in currency i
    
Securities issued by country i
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31. This material is drawn from Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2005b).
32. In Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2005b), we develop some additional mea-
sures of original sin and discuss their strengths and weaknesses.
33. In Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2005b) we construct an alternative measure
that takes into account bank loans. However, in order to construct this index it is necessary
to make assumptions about the currency composition of these loans.
34. The weight is equal to (total securities issued by country i)/(total bank loans   total se-
curities issued by country i).drop in original sin in Euroland countries.35 Developing countries have
comparatively high levels of original sin, with Latin America having the
most and Eastern Europe the least.
As argued above, we expect countries with original sin to be more in-
clined to accumulate international reserves and to use them to stabilize the
exchange rate. Table 3.3 tests these hypotheses. All regressions in this table
control for the level of development (proxied by the log of GDP per capita),
openness, and foreign debt (total debt securities plus international loans)
as a share of GDP. All variables are averages for the period 1993–98.36
Column (1) considers the choice of exchange rate regime. The depend-
ent variable LYS is the de facto classiﬁcation of Levy Yeyati and Sturzeneg-
ger (2000), which equals 1 for countries with ﬂoating exchange rates, 2 for
countries with intermediate regimes, and 3 for countries with ﬁxed rates.
Since this measure increases with exchange rate inﬂexibility, we expect a
positive relationship with original sin. The coeﬃcient in question is posi-
tive and signiﬁcant, indicating that countries with original sin ﬂoat less
freely.37 The coeﬃcient is also economically important. It suggests that
moving OSIN from 1 to 0 is associated with a jump of one and a half points
on the Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) three-point scale. Countries
previously inclined to peg will move to limited ﬂexibility, while countries
previously following policies of limited ﬂexibility will be inclined to ﬂoat.
Original sin is one explanation, then, for the fear-of-ﬂoating phenomenon.
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Table 3.2 Measures of original sin (OSIN) by country groupings (simple average)
1993–1998 1999–2001
Financial centers 0.07 0.08
Euroland 0.53 0.09a
Other developed 0.78 0.72
Oﬀshore 0.96 0.87
Developing 0.96 0.93
Latin America 0.98 1.00
Middle East and Africa 0.95 0.90
Asia and Paciﬁc 0.99 0.94
Eastern Europe 0.91 0.84
Source: Authors’ calculations.
aIn the 1999–2001 period it is impossible to allocate the debt issued by nonresidents in euros
to any of the individual member countries of the currency union. Hence, the number here is
not the simple average, but is calculated taking Euroland as a whole.
35. This is to be expected, since all of them, including a number of small ones that had not
previously enjoyed the privilege, immediately became issuers of a major currency.
36. Since table 3.2 suggests a structural shift in 1999.
37. Since LYS is bounded at 1 and 3, we estimate the equation using double-censored To-
bit. In Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2005b) we explore whether this result could be
due to reverse causality. We refer the reader to that paper for further discussion.Next we explore whether countries with high levels of original sin hold
more reserves. As noted in section 3.2, this relationship sheds light on the
connections between original sin and currency mismatches. Since reserves
are often used to intervene in the foreign exchange market, their level may
also shed light on the freedom of the ﬂoat. The dependent variable here is
international reserves normalized by M2 (denoted RESM2). Column (2)
shows that the coeﬃcient on OSIN is positive, as expected, and signiﬁcant,
as before. The estimated coeﬃcient implies that the increase in reserves in
a country where OSIN equals 1 instead of 0 is 25 percent of M2.
Following Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998a, 1998b), we also deﬁne the
freedom of the ﬂoat as the volatility of exchange rates relative to the volatil-
ity of reserves (we denote the ratio as RVER). If countries with original sin
are less inclined to ﬂoat, we would expect a negative coeﬃcient. Column (3)
supports this hypothesis.
Next we consider the relationship between original sin and volatility of
growth and capital ﬂows.38There are at least three reasons why original sin
may be positively correlated with volatility. First, it limits the authorities’
capacity to undertake countercyclical policies. Second, dollar liabilities
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Table 3.3 Original sin and exchange rate volatility
LYS RESM2 RVER LYS RESM2 RVER
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Original sin 1.503 0.248 –0.801 2.285 0.357 –1.034
(3.56)∗∗∗ (3.74)∗∗∗ (2.02)∗∗ (3.43)∗∗∗ (4.01)∗∗∗ (2.12)∗∗
GDP per capita 0.302 –0.053 0.027 0.321 –0.047 0.014
(2.89)∗∗∗ (1.84)∗ (0.61) (2.53)∗∗ (1.74)∗ (0.31)
Openness 0.198 –0.014 1.018 0.129 –0.030 1.046
(0.92) (0.41) (2.88)∗∗∗ (0.60) (0.89) (2.99)∗∗∗
External debt/GDP 0.290 –0.036 –0.570 0.622 0.005 –0.664
(0.96) (0.66) (2.36)∗∗ (1.13) (0.09) (2.55)∗∗
Mismatch –0.037 –0.037 0.084
(0.35) (2.09)∗∗ (1.22)
Constant –2.187 0.531 0.101 –3.094 0.399 0.394
(1.94)∗ (1.73)∗ (0.17) (2.14)∗∗ (1.37) (0.56)
No. of observations 75 65 65 59 64 64
R-squared 0.37 0.62 0.42 0.63
Notes: Equations (1) and (4) are estimated by weighted Tobit. All the other equations are es-
timated with weighted OLS with robust standard errors. Absolute value of t-statistics in
parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
38. Besides the independent variables included in table 3.3, we also control for the volatility
of terms of trade. All equations are estimated by weighed OLS using robust standard errors.limit the central bank’s ability to act as a lender of last resort. Third, dol-
lar-denominated debt increases the costs of currency depreciations that, in
the event of a currency crisis, may lead to large falls in output.
Table 3.4 conﬁrms the existence of a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
relationship between original sin and macroeconomic volatility. The esti-
mated coeﬃcient implies that going from an OSIN of 0 to an OSIN of 1
raises the volatility of GDP growth by 1.1 percentage points. Given that the
average volatility of GDP growth is 1.5 percent in industrial countries and
3.5 percent in developing countries, original sin may account for a signiﬁ-
cant part of the diﬀerence.
A ﬁnal set of equations further explores the relationship between origi-
nal sin and credit ratings (introduced in table 3.1 above). We expect origi-
nal sin to be negatively related to ratings because it makes the cost of ser-
vicing debt dependent on a real exchange rate that is procyclical, increasing
the states of the world in which payment is diﬃcult.39We regress credit rat-
ings on OSIN, several standard ﬁscal indicators (public debt over GDP,
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Table 3.4 Original sin and GDP and capital ﬂow volatility
Growth Flows Growth Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Original sin 0.011 7.069 0.016 9.139
(1.87)∗ (3.54)∗∗∗ (1.49) (1.53)
GDP per capita –0.012 –3.242 –0.012 –3.265
(2.19)∗∗ (2.56)∗∗ (2.03)∗∗ (2.00)∗
Openness –0.001 –4.250 –0.002 –5.136
(0.14) (1.21) (0.29) (0.90)
Terms-of-trade volatility –0.000 0.221 –0.000 0.201
(0.90) (1.08) (0.82) (0.73)
External debt/GDP –0.014 0.212 –0.025 –2.747
(1.67)∗ (0.06) (1.64) (0.29)
Mismatch –0.002 –0.655
(1.18) (1.29)
Constant 0.128 33.134 0.133 33.181
(2.30)∗∗ (2.40)∗∗ (2.17)∗∗ (1.91)∗
No. of observations 77 33 63 23
R-squared 0.41 0.63 0.38 0.59
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
39. Hausmann (2003) provides a value-at-risk model of credit ratings and shows that orig-
inal sin makes debt service depend diﬀerently on the variances and covariances of output, the
real exchange rate, and the real interest rate. Moreover, the arguments already presented
explain why these variances and covariances are themselves diﬀerent in countries with orig-
inal sin.public debt over government revenues), the country’s level of economic de-
velopment (as proxied by per capita income), and the share of external debt
in GDP. S&P rating data, adjusted as above, are used in what follows.
We ﬁnd a strong negative correlation between original sin and credit rat-
ings. Columns (1)–(5) of table 3.5 conﬁrm that original sin is correlated
with creditworthiness even after controlling for the level of development,
total external debt, public debt relative to GDP or revenues, terms-of-trade
volatility, and the real exchange rate volatility.40 A drop in OSIN from 1 to
0 is associated with a ﬁve-notch improvement in credit ratings. This would
push most countries in the sample above investment grade.
3.3.2 Currency Mismatches
Goldstein and Turner (2004) suggest that original sin has been improp-
erly used as a proxy for aggregate currency mismatches. To this we would
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Table 3.5 Original sin and credit ratings
RATING
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Original sin –5.844 –5.642 –5.346 –7.202 –7.195 –4.949
(4.07)∗∗∗ (4.00)∗∗∗ (4.08)∗∗∗ (5.20)∗∗∗ (5.05)∗∗∗ (2.90)∗∗∗
Debt/GDP –2.426 –2.376 –3.721 –3.695 –2.358
(2.51)∗∗ (2.71)∗∗∗ (3.79)∗∗∗ (3.66)∗∗∗ (2.31)∗∗
Debt/revenues –1.000
(2.49)∗∗
GDP per capita 2.917 2.670 2.758 1.618 1.636 2.992
(8.47)∗∗∗ (6.15)∗∗∗ (8.65)∗∗∗ (4.25)∗∗∗ (4.12)∗∗∗ (9.09)∗∗∗
External debt ratio 2.184 2.784 1.390 3.546 3.617 5.309
(1.43) (1.52) (0.99) (2.11)∗∗ (2.00)∗ (2.85)∗∗∗
Terms-of-trade –0.092 0.015
volatility (2.49)∗∗ (0.29)




Constant –8.062 –5.962 –5.931 8.394 8.114 –9.000
(2.12)∗∗ (1.28) (1.66) (1.83)∗ (1.69)∗ (2.39)∗∗
No. of observations 56 49 54 41 40 45
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
40. The volatility of the real exchange rate may be persistent (depending on openness of the
economy and the commodity composition of exports), and it is likely to be correlated with the
probability of payment diﬃculties.only say “not by us.” They suggest that a measure of aggregate mismatches
should take into account the currency composition of domestic debt. This
is incorrect, since if that debt is domestically held, the assets and liabilities
of residents cancel out in the aggregate. To the extent that domestically is-
sued, foreign currency–denominated or linked debt is held by foreigners,
that is another issue. Such debt falls conceptually under the heading of for-
eign currency–denominated external debt.
In practice, holdings of domestically issued, foreign currency debt
owned by foreigners are not easy to track. Some information can be ob-
tained by a report on the currency composition of all holdings by U.S. res-
idents of foreign securities for 2001 issued by the U.S. Department of the
Treasury. This report has the advantage that it includes holdings of locally
issued instruments; its disadvantage is that it covers only the holdings of
U.S. residents. These data, summarized in table 3.6, corroborate the idea
that the global portfolio is concentrated in very few currencies and that,
by implication, the issuers of other currencies suﬀer from original sin (in
other words, that the claims they sell to foreigners are predominantly de-
nominated in foreign currencies, whether these are issued on foreign mar-
kets or not). Of the $648 billion of ﬁnancial claims on foreigners held by
U.S. residents in 2001, $456 billion (fully 70 percent) were denominated in
U.S. dollars. U.S. residents hold 50.9 percent of their claims on Euroland
countries in euros and 22.5 percent of their claims on other advanced
countries in the currencies of those countries but only 3.1 percent of their
claims on developing countries in the currencies of those developing
countries.41
Goldstein and Turner (2003) deﬁne their measure of aggregate eﬀective
currency mismatches (AECM) as
(2) AECM    FCSHARE,
where NFCA is net foreign currency assets, EXP is exports, and FC-
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41. Burger and Warnock (2003) look at these data from a diﬀerent point of view, one that
is entirely orthogonal to our point. They compare U.S. holdings of European bonds as a share
of the total European market with U.S. holdings of Canadian (or emerging market) bonds ex-
pressed as a share of the Canadian (or emerging market) bond market. In Europe, where the
overall bond market is much larger, they obtain a relatively small fraction. But this is due to
the larger denominator. Consider a world in which the European economy and European
bond market are many times larger than those of the United States. We would then see U.S.
investors holding only a small fraction of total European bond issuance. But this would tell
us nothing about Europe’s susceptibility to original sin; it would only conﬁrm that the Euro-
pean economy and bond market are very much larger than those of the United States. In ad-
dition, Burger and Warnock look at asset allocation by region of issuer rather than by cur-
rency composition, which is our concern. Thus, table 2 in their paper, cited by Goldstein and










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.ternational).42 Unfortunately, the data do not exist to compute AECM for
a substantial number of countries. In particular, information on net foreign
currency assets beyond international reserves and on the currency compo-
sition of total debt (international and domestic) are available for a limited
number of countries. For this reason, Goldstein and Turner restrict their
sample to twenty-two countries.
It is possible to build a measure similar to AECM for a larger sample.
Consider the following index:
(3) MISMATCH    OSIN,
where RES is international reserves, DEBT is international debt, and other
variables are deﬁned as above.43 MISMATCH is not identical to AECM,
but for the countries for which we have data on both the correlation of the
two measures is 0.82 (p-value   0.000).44
We now augment the preceding regressions with this measure.45 To fa-
cilitate comparison we multiply MISMATCH by –1 so that a higher value
indicates a higher mismatch.
Columns (4)–(6) of table 3.3 show that controlling for MISMATCH does
not eliminate the correlation between original sin and our three measures of
exchange rate ﬂexibility. If anything, the eﬀect of OSIN becomes stronger.
MISMATCH has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on RESM2 (the ratio of reserves to
M2), but this is to be expected because reserves are used in the construction
of MISMATCH. There is no signiﬁcant correlation between MISMATCH
and either LYS or RVER, our two measures of exchange rate policy. Col-
umns (3) and (4) of table 3.4 similarly show that MISMATCH is not signif-
icantly correlated with the volatility of growth or capital ﬂows.46
The last column of table 3.5 checks whether controlling for MIS-
RES   DEBT
  
EXP
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42. Goldstein and Turner suggest that this is a good measure of overall mismatches be-
cause, besides capturing both sides of the balance sheet and considering the currency de-
nomination of total debt, it also has substantial volatility over time and hence the potential of
being a useful leading indicator of currency crises. Note that since higher levels of AECM in-
dicate lower mismatches, when NFCA is positive they replace exports with imports.
43. We could also measure mismatches as [RES – (DEBT   OSIN)]/EXP. This alternative
deﬁnition makes more sense to us, but the one in the text is closer to that used by Goldstein
and Turner. In practice, the two measures are highly correlated. The results discussed below
do not change if we use one measure instead of the other.
44. In particular, MISMATCH does not capture net international assets or measure the
currency composition of total debt.
45. The present expanded sample includes twenty of Goldstein and Turner’s twenty-two
countries. (Some of the data needed to construct the mismatch proxy for China and Taiwan
are not available.)
46. Including this variable in the regressions also reduces the explanatory power of original
sin; with a pvalue of 0.14, OSIN is no longer statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. At
the same time, controlling for MISMATCH substantially raises the point estimate of OSIN.
This suggests that the drop in statistical signiﬁcance is due to the fact we are now forced to use
a smaller sample. If we estimate equations (1) and (2) on the same sample as equations (3) and
(4) we ﬁnd results similar to those of columns (3) and (4): the point estimates of original sin
increase, but the coeﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcant.MATCH aﬀects the relationship between original sin and credit ratings.
The signiﬁcance of MISMATCH indicates that countries with large stocks
of international reserves and small international debts have better ratings,
other things being equal, these variables providing widely utilized rules of
thumb for the rating agencies. But controlling for MISMATCH leaves the
point estimate and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient on OSIN unchanged. An
interpretation is that credit ratings are sensitive to both whether a country
can borrow abroad in its own currency and how eﬀectively it manages any
currency mismatches that result from its inability to do so.
3.3.3 Debt Intolerance
Recall that Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano (2003) deﬁne debt intoler-
ance as the inability of emerging markets to manage external debts that are
manageable for advanced countries. They operationalize it as the relation-
ship of external debt (scaled by GDP or exports) to a measure of country
risk (credit ratings).
We already included the debt-GDP and debt-revenue ratios in the credit
rating regressions reported earlier in this section, along with OSIN. There
we found that both original sin and debt ratios matter for credit ratings.47
We can generalize this analysis by allowing the debt ratio to have a diﬀer-
ent impact on credit ratings in advanced and developing countries. Let
DE_GDP  IND and DE_RE  IND denote the eﬀect of the debt-GDP and
debt–tax revenue ratios in the advanced economies and DE_GDP   DEV
and DE_RE   DEV the eﬀect of these same ratios in developing countries.
Table 3.7shows that the impact of original sin on credit ratings is robust to
this extension. When we add a separate intercept for developing countries
to avoid loading all other respects in which advanced and developing coun-
tries diﬀer into the DE_GDP   DEV and DE_REV   DEV terms, original
sin remains signiﬁcant and important, while there is again no diﬀerence in
the elasticity of credit ratings with respect to the external debt ratio in de-
veloping versus advanced economies.
We constructed two alternative measures of debt intolerance and
checked whether adding them to our regressions for exchange rate ﬂexibil-
ity diminishes the impact of original sin. The ﬁrst measure, DI1, is nonoﬃ-
cial external debt (scaled by GDP) relative to RATING.48 The second one,
DI2, is the domestic and external public debt (again scaled by GDP) rela-
tive to RATING. Table 3.8 asks whether controlling for debt intolerance,
so measured, aﬀects the correlation between original sin and exchange rate
ﬂexibility.49 It turns out that these proxies for debt intolerance have little
Currency Mismatches, Debt Intolerance, and Original Sin 141
47. As does MISMATCH—again, see table 3.5.
48. Our measure diﬀers from that of Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano in that we include
both public and private debt while excluding oﬃcial instead of concessional debt.
49. When we use DI1, we run regressions both including and excluding external debt over
GDP from some speciﬁcations on the grounds that this variable is in the numerator of DI1.additional impact on exchange rate ﬂexibility, while the results for original
sin are basically unchanged.50
Table 3.9examines the implications of adding these alternative measures
of debt intolerance to our analysis of the volatility of growth and capital
ﬂows. Their addition does not diminish the impact of original sin on the
volatility of either GDP growth or capital ﬂows. In contrast, neither mea-
sure of debt intolerance has a signiﬁcant impact on the volatility of GDP
growth.
There is some evidence that debt intolerance is signiﬁcantly correlated
with the volatility of capital ﬂows. But when we separate the variable into
its two components (debt ratio and credit rating), we ﬁnd that most of the
explanatory power resides with the denominator (see columns [9]–[11] of
table 3.9). Total external debt over GDP and government debt over GDP
are never statistically signiﬁcant (total debt also has the wrong sign). This
142 Barry Eichengreen, Ricardo Hausmann, and Ugo Panizza
Table 3.7 Original sin and credit rating in developing and industrial countries
RATING
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Original sin –5.100 –5.385 –4.751 –5.101
(3.38)∗∗∗ (3.46)∗∗∗ (3.32)∗∗∗ (3.53)∗∗∗
DE_GDP   IND –1.553 –2.451
(1.31) (2.05)∗∗
DE_GDP   DEV –3.557 –2.475
(2.66)∗∗ (1.84)∗
DE_RE   IND –0.860 –1.354
(1.57) (2.45)∗∗
DE_RE   DEV –1.113 –0.847
(2.22)∗∗ (1.79)∗
GDP per capita 2.663 2.575 1.936 1.729
(6.71)∗∗∗ (5.12)∗∗∗ (4.00)∗∗∗ (3.01)∗∗∗
External debt/GDP 2.252 2.799 1.751 2.015
(1.50) (1.54) (1.22) (1.17)
Developing –3.004 –3.226
(2.38)∗∗ (2.52)∗∗
Constant –6.314 –5.288 1.606 4.085
(1.58) (1.06) (0.32) (0.69)
No. of observations 56 49 56 49
Notes: Table shows weighted Tobit estimations. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.is telling us that countries with low credit ratings have relatively volatile
capital ﬂows, which is not surprising given the bidirectional causality be-
tween the variables.51
3.4 Additional Issues
In this section we consider a number of additional issues arising from the
recent literature related to this paper.
3.4.1 Hedging
Eﬀorts to measure an economy’s vulnerability to balance sheet eﬀects
using the value of securities issued abroad that are denominated in foreign
currencies can mislead if swaps and other derivative transactions are used
to hedge currency exposures.52 The limited availability of information on
derivative transactions is thus an impediment to empirical work in this
area.53
Of course, if foreigners hold no ﬁnancial claims on a country that are de-
nominated in its own currency (the extreme form of original sin that ap-
pears to aﬄict fully half of the countries considered in the appendix to
Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza 2005b), then its aggregate foreign
currency exposure cannot be hedged as a matter of deﬁnition.54 For resi-
dents of the country to swap out of their aggregate currency mismatch,
there must be someone on the other side of the swap. If foreigners are un-
willing to hold local currency exposure, they will be unwilling to purchase
swaps, and the issuing country will be unable to hedge its aggregate foreign
currency exposure. Firms can use hedges to pass around foreign currency
exposure like a hot potato, but as a group they cannot shed it if foreign in-
vestors are unwilling to hold it.55 If that exposure is reallocated domesti-
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51. In addition, we reject the null that the two coeﬃcients enter with equal and opposite
signs, as suggested by the debt intolerance hypothesis. This is shown in the last two rows,
which check whether the sum of the rating and debt coeﬃcients (evaluated at the mean of the
respective variables) is equal to zero and strongly reject the hypothesis.
52. Simply tabulating the value of foreign currency–denominated securities sold to for-
eigners will not produce a measure of gross foreign currency exposure, for example, if do-
mestic issuers use derivative transactions to swap out of the foreign currency.
53. To put the point another way, the diﬃculty of tracking oﬀ-balance-sheet transactions
creates problems for the balance sheet approach.
54. Goldstein and Turner (2004) state that the “original sin hypothesis” assumes that all
emerging markets are alike in terms of their ability to hedge foreign exposures. If they are al-
luding to our work, then this description is erroneous. To the contrary, we emphasize that
those countries with the most severe cases of original sin (i.e., when all of the country’s debt
to foreigners is denominated in foreign currency) are by deﬁnition unable to hedge their ex-
posures in the aggregate, while others may be able to do so to some extent.
55. Alternatively, the government can assume the risk. Bonomo, Martins, and Pinto (2003)
suggest that after the Brazilian devaluation of 1998 the government became the ultimate
source of hedging. In this case, then, the mismatch was transferred from the private to the
public sector.cally in eﬃcient ways—if it is transferred at a price to ﬁrms in the strongest
position to manage the associated risks (from ﬁrms producing nontrad-
ables to ﬁrms producing tradable goods, for example)—then the eﬀects of
original sin may be mitigated.56 But the eﬀects are analytically distinct
from the phenomenon itself.57
3.4.2 Measuring Currency Mismatch
In the case of aggregate currency mismatches, it is important to net a
country’s international reserves and other foreign currency–denominated
ﬁnancial assets from gross external liabilities denominated in foreign cur-
rency. It may or may not be important to also include domestic debts de-
nominated in foreign currency. If there is no foreign participation in do-
mestic debt markets, then the currency denomination of domestic debts
has no bearing on calculations of the aggregate currency mismatch, inso-
far as one resident’s domestic dollar (peso) liability is another resident’s
domestic dollar (peso) asset.58
With the growing participation of foreign investors in local emerging
bond markets, it becomes increasingly problematic to neglect the currency
denomination of issues on the latter. But it cannot simply be assumed that
all local currency issues are local currency denominated. Burger and
Warnock (2003, n. 9) observe that “BIS data on domestic bonds is not col-
lected at the security level but should contain only local-currency denomi-
nated bonds placed locally; for Argentina and Peru, however, it contains
some foreign currency issues” (emphasis added). Burger and Warnock re-
categorize the relevant bonds for these two countries. Unfortunately, it is
probable that there also exist other foreign currency issues in the BIS data.
There is also the fact that some fraction of emerging market debt securities
placed locally is indexed to the exchange rate rather than denominated in
foreign currency, creating the same problems as foreign currency–denomi-
nated debt from the point of view of the balance sheet literature.
Concentrating solely on the currency composition of ﬁnancial assets
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56. Goldstein and Turner (2004) criticize our OSIN measure for failing to distinguish the
allocation of currency risk between traded and nontraded goods–producing sectors. This
confuses the eﬀects of OSIN with its magnitude (in eﬀect, it fails to distinguish between the
left- and right-hand-side variables in our regression equations). We return to this point below.
It also confuses their concern, currency mismatches, with ours, the currency composition of
the gross external debt. This criticism is also disingenuous because Goldstein and Turner
themselves have no information on the distribution of aggregate currency exposures between
the traded and nontraded goods–producing sectors for the sample of twenty-two countries.
57. If hedging had been important in the sample period for mitigating the eﬀects of origi-
nal sin, we of course would not ﬁnd the strong correlation between original sin, fear of ﬂoat-
ing, capital ﬂow and output volatility, and credit ratings that we document in the previous sec-
tion.
58. The currency denomination of domestic debts may still have important implications for
the ﬁnancial vulnerability of individual ﬁrms and banks, as noted above (if, for example, for-
eign currency net liabilities are concentrated among producers of nontradables). But this vul-
nerability will not be picked up by aggregate measures of the currency mismatch.and liabilities also ignores natural hedges. The same exchange rate change
that increases the cost of servicing foreign currency–denominated external
obligations may increase the demand abroad for the exports of the in-
debted country and hence its capacity to meet its debt service obligations.
This observation has encouraged some students of currency mismatches to
normalize net foreign currency–denominated ﬁnancial debt by exports, as
we saw in equation (2) above.
But normalizing by exports, whether gross or net, confuses stocks with
ﬂows.59 What is relevant when the exchange rate changes is the (increase in
the) ﬂow of export revenues relative to the (increase in the ﬂow of) debt ser-
vice costs, not a comparison of stocks of ﬁnancial assets with ﬂows of ex-
port receipts. Comparing the ﬂow of export receipts with the ﬂow of inter-
est payments on foreign currency–denominated ﬁnancial assets would be
more appropriate in this context.60
Normalizing the stock of net external debt denominated in foreign cur-
rency by exports also conﬂates the extent of the mismatch with its eﬀects.
A country that exports less will almost certainly ﬁnd it harder to undertake
the macroeconomic adjustment needed to contend with the adverse bal-
ance sheet eﬀects of exchange rate depreciation. But the impact of an ex-
change rate change when there is a currency mismatch is diﬀerent from the
size of the mismatch.61 A measure like equation (2) might be defended as a
leading indicator of the potential severity of potential mismatch problems,
but this would be quite diﬀerent from saying that it is an adequate measure
of the extent of mismatches.
3.4.3 The Domestic Dimension
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) used original sin to refer to both the
diﬃculty emerging markets have in borrowing abroad in their own curren-
cies and the diﬃculty that many of them also experience in borrowing at
home, in local currency terms, at long maturities and ﬁxed rates. Countries
suﬀering from both problems will ﬁnd it particularly diﬃcult to cope with
adverse shocks. If they allow the currency to depreciate in response, they
will be hammered by the balance sheet eﬀects of the aggregate currency
mismatch. But if they attempt to support the currency by raising interest
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59. At the level of abstraction, Goldstein and Turner (2004) distinguish a ﬂow measure of
mismatches from a stock measure of mismatches, but this distinction is not maintained when
they turn to empirics and develop the measure reproduced in equation (2) above.
60. In addition, the same distinction between gross and net foreign currency–denominated
ﬁnancial obligations emphasized elsewhere applies to exports as well; the (increase in) export
revenues should presumably be net (of the increase in import spending) rather than gross.
61. In a regression framework, an appropriate way of controlling for the fact that the same
currency mismatch may have larger eﬀects on macroeconomic variables in less open econ-
omies is to interact the mismatch variable with a measure of openness (also controlling sepa-
rately for openness, since openness may also aﬀect those macroeconomic variables through
non–balance sheet channels), not to construct a variable that conﬂates the extent of the mis-
match with the likely magnitude of its eﬀects.rates, ﬁrms and banks will have their ﬁnancial situation destabilized by the
rise in the short-term interest rate, given the absence of long-term ﬁxed-
rate debt.62
In subsequent work we narrowed our deﬁnition, focusing on the diﬃ-
culty that emerging markets experience in borrowing abroad in their own
currencies, reﬂecting evidence that, with suﬃcient time and eﬀort, it has
become possible for some of them to develop the capacity to place longer-
term domestic currency issues with local residents. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF; 2003) reports that local corporate bond issues in
emerging markets grew by a factor of 10 between 1997–99 and 2000–2001
and that local bond markets have been the dominant source of funding for
the public sector in emerging markets as a class. The role of domestic bond
issues in corporate funding has been particularly important in Latin Amer-
ica, where local bond issues nearly equaled the sum of international issues
of bonds, equities, and syndicated lending in the period 1997–2001.
At the same time, a substantial number of domestic bond placements are
indexed to the exchange rate, as noted above, rendering them indistin-
guishable from a currency-risk point of view from foreign currency–
denominated issues. A substantial share of the remainder is indexed to the
short-term interest rate, thereby providing no protection from interest rate
hikes. Still, emerging markets, especially in Asia, have made some progress
in issuing long-dated bonds that, when indexed at all, are indexed to slowly
moving variables like inﬂation rather than to ﬁnancial variables like ex-
change rates and short-term interest rates that respond instantaneously to
shocks.63
Figure 3.1 shows a scatter plot of our original sin measure (OSIN) ver-
sus a measure of the ability to issue domestic currency long-term ﬁxed-rate
debt, or “domestic original sin” (DSIN), for all countries for which we
have been able to construct both measures. Our main source of informa-
tion on domestic original sin is JPMorgan’s (1998, 2000, 2002) Guide to Lo-
cal Markets, which reports detailed information on domestically traded
public debt for twenty-four emerging market countries. We divide out-
standing government bonds into ﬁve categories: (a) long-term domestic
currency ﬁxed rate (DLTF); (b) short-term domestic currency ﬁxed rate
(DSTF); (c) long-term (or short-term) domestic currency debt indexed to
interest rate (DLTII); (d) long-term domestic currency debt indexed to
prices (DLTIP); and (e) foreign currency debt (FC). We deﬁne domestic
original sin as
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62. This was the situation in which Asian banks that had funded themselves by incurring
short-term obligations found themselves in 1997; it is also the reason the dilemma of whether
to let the exchange rate go or to defend it with interest rate hikes was a no-win situation.
63. Thus, in our empirical work we classify countries as not suﬀering from the domestic as-
pect of original sin only when they have issued signiﬁcant amounts of domestic currency debt
that is not ﬂoating rate, short term, or dollar indexed. In one of our measures, we include debt
that is indexed to the consumer price index, a more slowly moving nonﬁnancial variable.DSIN  
This deﬁnition focuses on both foreign currency debt and domestic cur-
rency short-term debt (or long-term but indexed to the interest rate).64
Note that there are a number of countries with low levels of DSIN but
high levels of OSIN, such as Chile, Israel, India, Hungary, and Thailand.
Contrary to the conjecture of Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano (2003), it is
not obvious that the domestic and international aspects of original sin are
determined by identical sets of factors.65
There is now a substantial literature on the development of domestic
bond markets and on the relevant policy initiatives (see Harwood 2000;
Herring and Chatusripitak 2000). Steps for developing domestic bond
markets include running stable macroeconomic policies, strengthening
FC   DSTF   DLTII
     
FC   DLTF   DSTF   DLTII   DLTIP
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Fig. 3.1 Domestic versus international original sin (2001)
64. We only have information on traded debt (and mostly public debt). Hence, if a country
has a market for long-term ﬁxed-rate bank loans but no market for long-term ﬁxed-rate debt
instruments, our indexes may overestimate original sin. If, on the other hand, a country has a
market for long-term ﬁxed-rate debt instruments but no market for long-term ﬁxed-rate bank
loans, our indexes will provide a lower bound for original sin. The data in ﬁgure 3.1 are for
December 2001, with the exception of Argentina (where the data refer to 1998) and Egypt
(where the data refer to 2000).
65. On the other hand, there are no countries with high levels of DSIN and low values of
OSIN. This supports the idea that resolving the domestic aspects of original sin is a necessary
condition for addressing the international aspect. Hausmann and Panizza (2003) show that
the determinants of DSIN and OSIN are empirically quite diﬀerent, with inﬂation history
and institutions playing a larger role in the former and country size playing an important and
robust role in the latter.payment and settlement systems, and using regulation to encourage trans-
parency on the part of market participants. But what is striking is that the
same emerging markets that have made progress in these areas and thus
have been rewarded with faster domestic bond market development have
made less progress in acquiring the capacity to borrow abroad in their own
currencies. This is the observation that led us to more narrowly focus our
deﬁnition of original sin. It is what has led us to conjecture that something
about the structure of foreign demand for claims denominated in the local
currency is contributing to the problem of original sin.66
Even if domestic reforms that help to promote the development of local
markets do not eliminate original sin, might they not eliminate the main
reason for worrying about it by eliminating the need for countries to bor-
row abroad? With well-developed domestic ﬁnancial markets, the argu-
ment might run, it will become possible to ﬁnance domestic investment out
of domestic savings, with no need for recourse to foreign ﬁnance. However,
such a conclusion would minimize the beneﬁts of international borrowing
(and lending) for smoothing consumption, diversifying risk, and aug-
menting investment where appropriate. Countries like the United States
with well-developed domestic ﬁnancial markets still make use of the capi-
tal account for these purposes. It is not obviously the case, in other words,
that well-developed domestic ﬁnancial markets render the foreign ﬁnance
superﬂuous.67 To the contrary, the case for having safe access to interna-
tional ﬁnance remains compelling.
The question is what safety requires. Potential borrowers must pursue
macroeconomic, ﬁnancial, and institutional reforms in order to be able to
deploy foreign funding productively and become attractive destinations for
international capital ﬂows. But potential borrowers and lenders must also
be able to address the sources of the reluctance of foreign investors to hold
claims denominated in the currencies of emerging markets in order to cre-
ate an attractive balance between the risks and returns of borrowing
abroad. It is to this problem that we now turn.
3.4.4 Reﬂections on Causes
In Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2005a) we examine several po-
tential explanations for original sin. Although level of development, mon-
etary credibility, and quality of institutions may play a role, the evidence
there suggests that these variables by themselves cannot account for the
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66. We consider this possibility more systematically below.
67. Goldstein and Turner (2004, p. 21) write that they ﬁnd unpersuasive “the view (implicit
in the OSH [original sin hypothesis]) that any analysis of the path to reduced ﬁnancial fragility
and higher economic growth in emerging markets should concentrate exclusively on external
sources of ﬁnance.” This position is certainly not implicit in our work. Rather, our position is
that domestic bond market development does not eliminate the argument for international ﬁ-
nance. If we have focused on measures to enhance access to international ﬁnance, this is be-
cause this aspect of the problem is particularly diﬃcult to solve (as is explained in the text).widespread nature of the phenomenon. Country size is the only variable
analyzed that is both statistically and economically signiﬁcant as a deter-
minant of original sin. It is this ﬁnding that leads us to formulate an expla-
nation for original sin based on the costs and returns to portfolio diversiﬁ-
cation at the global level.
Here we summarize our previous empirical analysis and consider some
additionalwrinkles.68Country size is measured as the principal component
of the log of total GDP, log of total trade and the log of total domestic
credit. Column (1) of table 3.10shows that country size is negatively related
to original sin. A variety of sensitivity analyses support the conclusion that
size is important in regressions seeking to explain original sin. We therefore
control for country size in all of the empirical analysis that follows.
Table 3.2 above suggested that original sin varies between ﬁnancial cen-
ters, the Euroland countries, other advanced economies, and developing
countries. In the analysis that follows we therefore control for membership
in these country groups by including a vector of country-group variables
(where developing country is the omitted alternative). Table 3.2 shows that
these ﬁxed eﬀects are quite important.69
In column (2) of table 3.10 we add per capita GDP as a measure of eco-
nomic development. Both this variable and country size are negatively cor-
related with original sin, although only size is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero at standard conﬁdence levels.
In column (3) we consider inﬂationary history as a measure of monetary
credibility. Our variable is constructed as the average of log inﬂation over
the last twenty years in an eﬀort to capture any lingering eﬀects of policies
long past. While countries with histories of more inﬂation appear to have
more original sin, the eﬀect does not approach statistical signiﬁcance at
standard conﬁdence levels.70
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68. Since our dependent variable ranges between 0 and 1, all the regressions are estimated
by weighted Tobit. In Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2005a) we show that the results
are robust to alternative estimation techniques. As before, all variables are measured as 1993–
98 averages (except where explicitly noted to the contrary).
69. Not including these ﬁxed eﬀects, which subsequent analysis shows to be important, may
therefore bias our results. Doing so may attribute to a country’s policies the eﬀects of its status
as a ﬁnancial center. Or it may attribute to, say, inﬂation the eﬀect of all the characteristics of
a country that are associated with its industrial-country status. In the interest of completeness,
we show below how the results change when we omit these country-group ﬁxed eﬀects and pro-
vide an interpretation of the diﬀerences. It turns out that they do not change very much.
70. Shorter lags of inﬂation only strengthen this result. This ﬁnding is also robust to a vari-
ety of sensitivity analyses. When we replace average inﬂation with the log of maximum in-
ﬂation over the period, we again ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship with original sin. To test
potential nonlinearities in the relationship between inﬂation and original sin, we also ex-
perimented with both the average log of inﬂation and its square. In this case, neither of the
coeﬃcients on inﬂation is signiﬁcant. Alternatively, we use the principal component of aver-
age inﬂation and maximum inﬂation and again ﬁnd no signiﬁcant correlation with original














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Columns (4) and (5) test the hypothesis that original sin is the conse-
quence of debt-intolerant countries borrowing too much.71 Regressing
original sin on the public debt–GDP ratio, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on
the latter is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. To capture the possibility
that the impact of the same debt-GDP ratio is greater in developing coun-
tries, column (5) allows the impact of debt to diﬀer between them (where
DE_GDP   DEV is the debt-GDP ratio interacted with a developing-
country dummy and DE_GDP   IND is the same ratio interacted with an
industrial-country dummy, as before). While we obtain a positive coeﬃ-
cient on debt-GDP for developing countries and a negative coeﬃcient for
the advanced countries, neither coeﬃcient diﬀers signiﬁcantly from zero at
standard conﬁdence levels.
Columns (6)–(9) consider institutional quality (using the index of rule of
law developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton 1999). The Tobit
regression in column (6) produces a negative eﬀect of institutions on orig-
inal sin, but one that is again statistically insigniﬁcant at standard conﬁ-
dence levels. Recent papers (e.g., Sachs 2001; Hall and Jones 1999; Ace-
moglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001) suggest focusing on geography and
colonial settlement patterns as ways of identifying the exogenous compo-
nent of institutions. When we instrument institutions with distance from
the equator (column [7]), we ﬁnd that the former is still not statistically sig-
niﬁcant. When we instrument institutions with the log of settler mortality
(column [8]), there again appears to be no eﬀect. Column (9), where we es-
timate this equation by OLS but use the same sample as in column (8), sug-
gests that this is not due to the limited number of countries for which we
have data on settler mortality.
In column (10) we consider the role of ﬁnancial development.72 We ﬁnd
a negative but not statistically signiﬁcant relationship between original sin
and ﬁnancial development as measured by the ratio of domestic credit to
GDP. To control for the endogeneity of ﬁnancial development, we next in-
strument the domestic credit–GDP ratio with the origin of the legal sys-
tem. We follow La Porta et al. (1998), using a dummy variable that takes a
value of 1 in countries that follow the French civil law tradition. Column
(11) shows that controlling for endogeneity does not aﬀect the result.
Column (1) of table 3.11 includes all of these variables in the same equa-
tion. We consider these to be the deﬁnitive hypothesis tests. Again, we ﬁnd
that the coeﬃcient on SIZE is negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
at conventional conﬁdence levels. In addition, GDP per capita and insti-
tutions are also statistically signiﬁcant. But while GDP per capita has the
expected negative sign, institutions have a positive coeﬃcient, as if coun-
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71. This would make debt intolerance the fundamental cause of the ﬁnancial fragility prob-
lem and original sin one of its symptoms.
72. Tirole (2002) provides a political economy explanation for a possible relationship be-
tween original sin and the development of the domestic ﬁnancial system.tries with worse institutions suﬀer less from original sin. This appears to be
due to the high correlation between GDP per capita and rule of law (0.83).
A Wald test suggests that the two variables are not jointly signiﬁcant (p-
value   0.14), and when they are entered one at a time (in columns [2] and
[3]) neither of them is statistically signiﬁcant. The last column shows that
the results do not change if we instrument institutions with latitude.73
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 thus suggest that original sin is robustly related to
country size and to countries’ status as ﬁnancial centers, advanced econ-
omies, or emerging markets but that it is only weakly related to institu-
tional variables like rule of law and measures of policy like inﬂation and ﬁs-
cal history.
When we eliminate the country-group dummies, in table 3.12, inﬂation
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Table 3.11 The causes of original sin: Encompassing tests
OSIN OSIN (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size –0.302 –0.325 –0.326 –0.333
(3.32)∗∗∗ (3.48)∗∗∗ (3.50)∗∗∗ (3.52)∗∗∗
GDP per capita –0.262 –0.127
(2.08)∗∗ (1.31)
AV_INF 0.288 0.150 0.070 –0.060
(0.89) (0.49) (0.29) (0.14)
DE_GDP –0.003 –0.102 0.044 –0.059
(0.02) (0.60) (0.26) (0.28)
Institutions 0.305 0.091 –0.120
(1.88)∗ (0.70) (0.33)
DC_GDP –0.313 –0.173 –0.403 –0.319
(1.05) (0.59) (1.38) (1.19)
FIN_CENTER –0.492 –0.453 –0.680 –0.479
(1.45) (1.31) (2.06)∗∗ (0.91)
EUROLAND 0.032 0.010 –0.220 –0.074
(0.15) (0.04) (1.18) (0.22)
OTH_DEVEL –0.053 0.030 –0.299 –0.072
(0.24) (0.14) (1.55) (0.17)
DEVELOPING
Constant 3.506 2.505 1.516 1.618
(3.54)∗∗∗ (3.22)∗∗∗ (7.66)∗∗∗ (4.89)∗∗∗
No. of observations 63 63 63 63
Notes: Table shows weighted Tobit estimations. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
73. When we instrument institutions with settler mortality, none of the explanatory vari-












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.history matters when entered by itself, as in column (2). There is also some
evidence of an eﬀect of institutions (whether modeled as exogenous or in-
strumented using settler mortality) in columns (5) and (7). There is more
evidence of the importance of ﬁnancial development (see column [9]), al-
though the correlation between ﬁnancial development and original sin is
not robust to instrumenting ﬁnancial development with the origin of the le-
gal code (see in column [10]).
But when we include proxies for the competing hypotheses simulta-
neously, in table 3.13, the results are essentially identical to before. Column
(1) shows that SIZE and GDP per capita are statistically signiﬁcant. Col-
umn (2) allows institutions to be endogenous (we use latitude as an instru-
ment) and shows that only size remains statistically signiﬁcant. Column (3)
treats both rule of law and domestic credit over GDP as endogenous (again
we instrument domestic credit over GDP with the origin of the legal code).
Once more, only SIZE enters with a coeﬃcient that is statistically distin-
guishable from zero at standard conﬁdence levels.74
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SIZE –0.352 –0.366 –0.700
(3.88)∗∗∗ (3.43)∗∗∗ (2.10)∗∗
GDP per capita –0.248 –0.156 –0.269
(2.30)∗∗ (0.52) (0.71)
AV_INF 0.274 0.164 0.775
(0.88) (0.32) (0.84)
DE_GDP –0.002 –0.050 –0.893
(0.01) (0.26) (1.09)
DC_GDP –0.291 –0.286 2.897
(1.25) (1.08) (0.91)
INSTITUTIONS 0.255 0.092 –0.546
(1.61) (0.15) (0.83)
Constant 3.437 2.785 2.546
(4.03)∗∗∗ (1.31) (1.22)
No. of observations 63 63 63
Notes: Table shows weighted Tobit estimations. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
74. If one ignores the fact that the coeﬃcients on the policy and institutional variables go
to zero when they are included in the equation simultaneously (which will be comfortable only
for readers with strong priors), then the contrast between tables 3.11 and 3.12 would suggest
an interpretation like the following. When the ﬁxed eﬀects for ﬁnancial centers, advanced
economies, and emerging markets are included in the equation, they absorb the cross-groupWhat might account for the fact that it is mainly large countries that
seem to be able to issue foreign debt in their own currencies and for the
concentration of the world’s portfolio in a few currencies? While each ad-
ditional currency adds opportunities for diversiﬁcation, it does so with
decreasing marginal beneﬁts. In a world with transaction costs (which
increase with the number of currencies in which investors take positions),
the optimal portfolio will therefore have a ﬁnite number of currencies.
Imagine the following situation.75 There are two countries: one has N
trees while the other has one tree. All trees are identical in their expected
income and its variance; the large country just has more of them. Shocks
to each tree are uncorrelated. Assume that the exchange rate moves with
the realization of relative output. If there were no transaction costs of in-
vesting abroad, then it would be optimal to hold a globally diversiﬁed port-
folio: the large country would invest 1/(N   1) of its wealth in the small
country, while the latter would invest N/(N   1) in the large country. Now
introduce costs to international transactions. If all countries were of size 1,
then the presence of transaction costs would not aﬀect the composition of
the world portfolio. But if country size diﬀers, then the beneﬁts of interna-
tional diversiﬁcation will be greater for the small country than for the large
one. There will be less appetite in the large country to hold the currency of
the small country, while there will still be a large appetite for the small
country to hold the assets of the large one. This is to say, large countries
oﬀer signiﬁcant diversiﬁcation possibilities, while small countries do not.
If the transaction costs associated with international diversiﬁcation are the
same for investors in both countries, then the world will choose to invest in
a few large currencies. Notice that this is through no fault of the small
country, but a consequence of the existence of cross-border costs and
asymmetries in size and diversiﬁcation.
An implication of this view is that even if we identify characteristics that
have allowed a few small countries to issue external debt in their own cur-
rencies—like, say, South Africa, New Zealand, or Poland—it would be a
fallacy of composition to assume that if other small countries acquired
those same characteristics then they too would make it into the world port-
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variation in the data. The coeﬃcient on a variable like, say, inﬂation or rule of law then picks
up only the within-group variation. This is telling us that if we could transform Colombia into
Canada and give the former the more favorable policy history and institutions of the latter
overnight (along with its greater proximity to large markets, etc.), then we would also give it
a greater ability to borrow abroad in its own currency. On the other hand, transforming
Colombia into Chile (in terms of the quality of policies and institutions) would do little to en-
hance its ability to borrow abroad in its own currency. This is not to reject the importance of
sound policies and institutional development. But it does suggest that the standard advice to
this eﬀect is not going to solve the problem of original sin that plagues emerging markets any
time soon.
75. We are indebted to Roberto Rigobon for yet unpublished joint work on this idea.folio. Each successful country may limit the chances of the others, given de-
clining marginal beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation.
A further implication of this approach is that country size matters for
original sin. Some countries have an advantage in shedding original sin be-
cause the large size of their economies and currency issue makes them at-
tractive as components of the world portfolio. In contrast, the currencies
of small countries add few diversiﬁcation beneﬁts relative to the additional
costs they imply.
Country size can explain why large countries like the United States and
Japan do not suﬀer from original sin. But what about Switzerland and, for
that matter, the United Kingdom? Note that the ﬁnancial-center dummy re-
mains large and signiﬁcant even after controlling for country size. This is an-
other way of saying that the United Kingdom and Switzerland have become
immune to the problem. But if becoming a ﬁnancial center is evidently an-
other way of shedding original sin, this is easier said than done. Clearly,
countries that either are or were major commercial powers (e.g., the United
States, Britain in the past) have a leg up. In addition, some countries have
been able to gain the status of ﬁnancial centers as a quirk of history or ge-
ography.76 Network externalities giving rise to historical path dependence
have worked to lock in their currencies’ international status: once the Swiss
franc was held in some international portfolios and used in some interna-
tional transactions, it became advantageous for additional investors and
traders to do likewise. And because Britain was the world’s leading indus-
trial, trading, and lending nation once upon a time, the pound sterling ac-
quired its position as a prominent currency for the denomination of interna-
tional claims—a luxury that the country enjoys to this day, albeit to a lesser
and declining extent. These observations are related to the literature on the
determinants of key currency status (Kiyotaki, Matsuyama, and Matsui
1992), which explains the dominance of a small number of currencies in in-
ternational markets as a function of network externalities and transaction
costs. This literature does not deny that additional countries can gain ad-
mission to this exclusive club, but it suggests that they face an uphill battle.
All this suggests that the global portfolio may be concentrated in a very
few currencies for reasons beyond control—at least, beyond that of the ex-
cluded countries.
3.4.5 Borio and Packer
Since the ﬁrst draft of this paper was circulated as an NBER working pa-
per, Borio and Packer (2004) have sought to replicate and extend its re-
gressions for credit ratings and the causes of original sin. Their tests diﬀer
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76. For example, Switzerland, a mountainous country at the center of Europe that was hard
to take over and also small enough to retain its neutrality, became a convenient destination
for foreign deposits.slightly from ours in their particulars. Thus, they use a slightly diﬀerent
measure of original sin (also drawn from the appendix in Eichengreen,
Hausmann, and Panizza 2005b). They attempt to adjust for hedging by
interacting our measures of original sin and currency mismatches with
the BIS’s data on total foreign exchange spot and derivatives transactions.
They use a diﬀerent measure of credit ratings (an average of Moody’s and
S&P ratings, in contrast to the S&P measure utilized here). In some of their
work they add measures of corruption and country risk constructed from
indexes provided by Transparency International and the ICRG, respec-
tively. They measure debt intolerance in the same manner as Reinhart, Ro-
goﬀ, and Savastano (2003; in addition to including the external debt ratio
as a regressor, interacting this with a dummy variable for emerging mar-
kets), and also model it as the interaction of the debt-GDP ratio with mea-
sures of recent default history and inﬂation history. And their analysis of
the causes of original sin pools the data for diﬀerent years rather than us-
ing cross-section averages as in subsection 3.4.4 above.
Despite these changes, their results for credit ratings are similar to our
own. Original sin continues to aﬀect credit ratings at the 99 percent level
despite the use of a longer list of controls, although their point estimate is
somewhat smaller than our own. They also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect for cur-
rency mismatches, as do we in table 3.5 above. Their debt intolerance prox-
ies are signiﬁcant about half the time.
Some of their ﬁndings regarding the causes of original sin are also con-
sistent with ours. They too report a signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient on coun-
try size. Our measure of the importance of inﬂation (average inﬂation over
the last twenty years) and their measure of strength of institutions (the
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton 1999 measure of rule of law) never
approach statistical signiﬁcance at standard conﬁdence levels.77 Where
their results appear to diﬀer is where they obtain a positive coeﬃcient on
an alternative measure of inﬂation (share of the last forty years when inﬂa-
tion exceeded 40 percent) and on the ICRG measure of political risk, sug-
gesting that past policies and current institutions do in fact aﬀect the inci-
dence of original sin.
There is some evidence that these ﬁndings are sensitive to the particulars
of speciﬁcation and estimation. Borio and Packer’s (2004) regressions ap-
pear to be estimated on pooled data, but the measure of inﬂation (the share
of the last forty years when inﬂation exceeded 40 percent) does not have
any within-country variation. In pure cross-section estimates (which seem
more appropriate given the lack of time variation in the key independent
variable) the signiﬁcance of this variable declines signiﬁcantly (as it does
when we adjust the standard errors for clustering). In addition, their re-
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77. They also obtain, counterintuitively, a negative coeﬃcient on corruption, suggesting
that more corrupt countries ﬁnd it easier to borrow abroad in their own currency.gressions do not include the dummy variables for country groups; adding
them, as in our table 3.12, causes the signiﬁcance of this variable to disap-
pear. We also worry about their use of data for the years 2000–2003 for the
Euroland countries, when the advent of the euro made the concept of orig-
inal sin much less relevant for them. Recall that we limit our own analysis
to data through 1998, with precisely this problem in mind. And when we
instrument the ICRG index of institutions (as in subsection 3.4.4), the sig-
niﬁcance of this variable also evaporates.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper we have contrasted three concepts widely utilized in the re-
cent literature on emerging market debt. Two of the terms—original sin
and debt intolerance—attempt to explain the same phenomenon, namely
the volatility of emerging market economies and the diﬃculty that these
countries have in servicing and repaying their external debts. The debt in-
tolerance school traces the problem to institutional weaknesses of emerg-
ing market economies that in turn lead to weak and unreliable policies. It
suggests that these countries’ histories have bequeathed a situation where
they ﬁnd it diﬃcult to run strong policies.
The original-sin school traces the problem instead to the structure of
global portfolios and international ﬁnancial markets. It suggests that
emerging market economies are volatile because they ﬁnd it diﬃcult to de-
nominate their obligations in units that better track their capacity to pay,
such as the domestic currency or the domestic consumption basket. It sug-
gests that this constraint derives in part from the structure of international
portfolios and the operation of international ﬁnancial markets. It points to
forces that concentrate international portfolios and markets in a few ma-
jor currencies—the dollar, euro, yen, pound, and Swiss franc—and to the
evidently limited appetite of international investors for adding additional
currencies to their portfolios.
In contrast, the literature on currency mismatches, as we read it, is con-
cerned with the consequences of these problems. It emphasizes balance
sheet mismatches that may arise either from the weak policies pointed to
by the debt intolerance literature or from the diﬃculty emerging markets
experience when attempting to place domestic currency–denominated
debt with foreign investors pointed to by work on original sin. It is con-
cerned with how these consequences are managed by the macroeconomic
and ﬁnancial authorities.
Thus, these terms should not be used interchangeably. The hypotheses
and problems to which they refer are distinct. Using them synonymously is
an unnecessary source of confusion.
We close with suggestions for investigators concerned with currency
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currency mismatches, the challenge is to show that mismatches can be mea-
sured with the precision needed to systematically test hypotheses regard-
ing their causes and consequences. Absent comprehensive information on
the currency denomination of assets, liabilities, swaps, and other deriva-
tives, it is diﬃcult to reliably measure the currency composition of a coun-
try’s external assets and liabilities. The same problem follows from the ab-
sence of information on foreign holdings of domestic placements and on
the presence or absence of exchange rate indexation clauses in those hold-
ings. Once the concept is adequately operationalized, the challenge will be
to model its determinants as well as its consequences—since the extent of
the mismatch is a choice variable of, among others, the government, which
chooses whether to restrict foreign borrowing and to insure against the
consequences by accumulating reserves—and to analyze the two aspects in
a consistent way.
For those concerned with debt intolerance, the challenge is to establish
the existence of links between past policies and current outcomes and to
document the mechanisms through which they act. Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and
Savastano (2003) suggest that the fact that the same countries have de-
faulted repeatedly over a period of centuries reﬂects the corrosive impact
of past policies on their ﬁnancial markets and tax systems today and,
through that channel, on their current management of external obliga-
tions. A correlation between past defaults and current defaults is insuﬃ-
cient to establish this case. That correlation could reﬂect any omitted vari-
able that matters persistently for debt-servicing diﬃculties and is slow to
change over time.78 The challenge is thus to show that past default plays a
causal role in the development of ﬁnancial markets and tax systems, after
controlling adequately for other determinants of their development, and
that the structure of ﬁscal and ﬁnancial systems in turn matters for current
debt-servicing outcomes, after similarly controlling for their other deter-
minants.
For those concerned with original sin, the challenge is to document the
distortions in global ﬁnancial markets that make it diﬃcult to get interna-
tional investors to add more currencies to their portfolios. In previous
work we speculated that most of the beneﬁts of international portfolio di-
versiﬁcation can be obtained by building portfolios limited to a handful of
currencies. If there are ﬁxed transaction and management costs associated
with including additional currencies, then the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts of
adding more may be dominated by these costs. Here, shedding light on the
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78. As we noted above, two candidates are the commodity composition of exports, which
aﬀects the volatility of the terms of trade, and the persistent diﬃculty that the same relatively
small, less developed countries have had in getting their currencies added to the global port-
folio.obstacles to getting international investors to hold additional currencies in
their portfolios is the principal challenge to research.
Appendix
Countries included in table 3.1 of this paper but not included in table B1
of Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano (2003): Austria, Barbados, Belgium,
Belize, China, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Latvia,
Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malta, Mongolia, Oman, Russian Federation,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Switzerland, Tunisia, and the United King-
dom.
Countries included in table B1 of Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano
(2003) but not included in table 3.1 of this paper: Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Hong Kong, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Mali, Malaysia,
Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sri
Lanka, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.
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Comment Joshua Aizenman
This is a comprehensive paper, which provides an overview of a large body
of research. The purpose of the paper is to compare and contrast three ap-
proaches dealing with balance sheet factors in emerging markets: original
sin (OS), debt intolerance (DI), and currency mismatches (CM).
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Joshua Aizenman is a professor of economics at the University of California, Santa Cruz,
and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.Synopsis of the Paper
As the paper’s title highlights, it shows that the OS, DI, and CM hy-
potheses, and problems with which these three approaches deal, are ana-
lytically distinct. Both OS and DI seek to explain the volatility of emerging
markets (EM) and their diﬃculty in servicing debts. The DI school argues
that institutional weaknesses of EM economies lead to weak and unreli-
able policies. In contrast, the OS school focuses on the structure of global
portfolios and international ﬁnancial markets. The CM concept deals with
the consequences of these problems. The authors point out that OS diﬀers
from CM. By deﬁnition, OS implies a gross foreign debt denominated in
foreign currency. But the country may or may not also incur CM, depend-
ing on how the authorities respond to the act of borrowing.
Debt intolerance is reﬂected in the EMs’ inability to manage levels of ex-
ternal debt that are manageable for OECD countries. As was shown by
Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano (2003), credit ratings fall more rapidly
with debt in EMs than in advanced countries, indicating that the former
have less debt management capacity. Possible interpretations of DI include
institutional weaknesses of EM economies which lead to weak and unreli-
able policies. Countries’ histories have bequeathed a situation where they
ﬁnd it diﬃcult to run strong policies. The Eichengreen, Hausmann, and
Panizza paper questions the validity of the debt intolerance tests imple-
mented by Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano, raising several robustness
concerns.
The authors illustrate the issues at hand by asking in section 3.2 why
Chile’s performance resembled that of Latin America and not Australia.
Original sin is part of the answer. Chile is a favorite example for economists
of a country with increasingly strong institutions and policies. Standard
institution strengthening measures have not impacted the capacity to bor-
row abroad in an EM’s own currency, over policy-relevant horizons. The
OS approach views this inability as a key shortcoming, explaining the
problems facing EMs.
A key part of the paper is section 3.3, where the authors run an implicit
horse race, contrasting OS versus CM and DI. They start by showing that
countries with high levels of OS hold more reserves, are less inclined to
ﬂoat, and are characterized by higher macro volatility and lower credit rat-
ings. The authors repeat the exercise adding measures of aggregate CM
and DI. The results suggest to the authors that the eﬀects of OS are more
statistically robust than those of these alternative concepts.
Comment 1: The Costs and Beneﬁts of External Borrowing
Original sin presumes that external borrowing is beneﬁcial. This pre-
sumption is not supported by the data of recent years.
The authors state early in section 3.2 that OS is deﬁned as “the inability
Currency Mismatches, Debt Intolerance, and Original Sin 165of a country to borrow abroad in its own currency.” They add that the “fo-
cus on external borrowing is motivated by the observation that, in the ab-
sence of other distortions, world welfare would be enhanced if capital
ﬂowed from capital-rich advanced countries to their more capital-poor
emerging market counterparts.”
Had OS been the only distortion, then removing it would have been wel-
fare improving. Yet, in practice, developing countries are struggling with a
large number of distortions. Hence, the welfare eﬀect of removing one dis-
tortion is ambiguous. Speciﬁcally, if removing the OS would increase the
volume of other distortion activities, it may be welfare reducing.
Unlike the authors, I argue that external borrowing, as a source of ﬁ-
nancing growth, is overrated. To illustrate this, I rely on results reported in
Aizenman, Pinto, and Radziwill (2004). Using the World Development In-
dicators data, we construct there a self-ﬁnance measure, indicating the
stock of tangible capital supported by actual national past saving, relative
to the actual stock of capital.1 We found that, in the 1990s, 90 percent of
the stock of tangible capital of a typical developing country was self-
ﬁnanced, and that higher self-ﬁnancing ratios were associated with higher
growth. Alternatively, in recent years, countries that relied more on exter-
nal ﬁnance, including external borrowing, grew at a slower rate. The data
are also consistent with the notion that the surge in capital inﬂows in the
aftermath of ﬁnancial liberalization funds capital outﬂows, with little im-
pact on self-ﬁnancing ratios.
These ﬁndings are consistent with several interpretations.
• Habit formation: A takeoﬀ triggered by relaxing a state’s attitude to-
ward private saving and investment increases both saving and invest-
ment. If saving and investment increased at the same rate, we would
observe a self-ﬁnanced higher growth rate, as has been the case in
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1. The ideal self-ﬁnancing would be obtained by unbounded backward discounting, had we
all the past information:
f ˆ   ,
where d is the depreciation rate of tangible capital, It and St are gross investment and national
saving at time t, in constant purchasing power parity, respectively. A value of 1 of the self-
ﬁnancing measure would correspond to an economy where the entire stock of domestic cap-
ital is self-ﬁnanced. A self-ﬁnancing ratio below 1 indicates reliance on foreign saving; 1 – fˆ
t
is the foreign-ﬁnancing ratio, measuring the fraction of domestic capital that was ﬁnanced
by foreign saving. In practice, the unbounded backward discounting is not feasible due to
scarcity of data. This limitation induces us to rely on approximated measures of self-
ﬁnancing. As is illustrated in Aizenman, Pinto, and Radziwill (2004), the approximated self-
ﬁnancing measure deviates from the ideal ﬁnancing measure by second-order magnitude. An
alternative strategy is to construct self-ﬁnancing ratios using gross domestic saving instead of
national saving (the gap between the two is the net current transfers from abroad). This does
not aﬀect the main results inferred by relying on the self-ﬁnancing ratio.
∑
 




i 1 It i(1   d)i 1China, India, and other countries in recent years (see Carroll, Over-
land, and Weil 2000 for further discussion).
• Collateral to induce FDI(Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber 2004):
Countries may accumulate foreign assets to signal their soundness, in
order to attract FDI.
• Most capital ﬂows are gross, with little net eﬀect (Dooley 1988). This is
consistent with response to diﬀerences in risk perceived by residents
and nonresidents.
Comment 2: Limited Ability to Test Which Approach—OS, DI, or CM—
Is Most Important
Some of the methodological concerns are generic and may apply equally
well to all tests of balance sheet problems; short of conducting controlled
experiments, available empirical procedures have limited power in identi-
fying the independent roles of OS, DI, and CM. More speciﬁc concerns:
• Original sin measures of most developing countries are practically the
same (one for most external OS measures, as can be seen in ﬁgure 3.1
in the paper). This suggests a censoring problem.
• Theory predicts a nonlinear interaction between OS, DI, and CM. It
may be hard to pick up such nonlinearity in a log linear model, espe-
cially if one is not testing a tightly speciﬁed model.
• The background literature suggests several variables that are omitted
in the present study, like polarization, political instability, and distri-
bution of income.
All the above suggest that more insight can be gained by looking at case
studies.
Comment 3: Is OS the Key for Explaining Problematic Performance?
Not Necessarily
A possible clue to the issues at hand is that there is very little variation in
the OS measures across countries, yet there is large variation in perfor-
mance. This observation suggests that countries may take oﬀwithout solv-
ing OS and without solving “institutional weaknesses.” Such a takeoﬀmay
be accomplished by relaxing the grip of the state on the private sector, en-
couraging, instead of penalizing, entrepreneurship (as has apparently been
the case of China, India, etc.). Hence, prolonged growth acceleration may
happen without dealing with constraints imposed by OS, or the constraints
imposed by existing institutions.
Comment 4: Are Institutional Weaknesses the Key to DI?
An alternative interpretation is that the key to DI is deeper structural
factors, including polarization, distribution of income, and political insta-
bility. More generally, DI may be related to the ability of the social contract
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cerns. All the above may explain the root sources of EM vulnerability, as
has been articulated in past contributions (see Alesina and Tabellini 1989;
Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini 1992; Rodrik 1999).
Comment 5: Second-Best Eﬀects of Relaxing OS Constraints
For countries characterized by overborrowing, relaxing the OS con-
straints without dealing with the overborrowing bias would increase ex-
cessive borrowing by weak regimes, reducing welfare. This is another ex-
ample of the second-best situation confronting most developing countries.
Comment 6: Chile versus Australia Is a Prime Example of OS
The latest World Development Indicators reveals that the real GDP per
capita growth rate of Chile was double that of Australia during 1986–2003
(0.04 versus 0.02). This may suggest that OS is not the major obstacle to
growth. It is also consistent with the ﬁndings of Caballero, Cowan, and
Kearns (2005), who contrasted country trust versus currency trust, argu-
ing that the lack of country trust is a more fundamental and serious prob-
lem behind sudden stops. They point out that Chile needs external insur-
ance more than Australia does, precisely because its terms-of-trade shocks
are ampliﬁed by the resulting contraction in the supply of external funds.
So OS is a greater problem for Chile than for Australia. “But importantly,”
Caballero et al. add, “OS is not the primitive problem behind the need
for substantial insurance; the problem is a lack of country-trust.” This is
vividly illustrated by the observation that Australia’s inﬂation was 4 per-
cent since federation (about 102 years ago), exceeding 20 percent in only
one year. In contrast, Chile’s inﬂation exceeded 20 percent in approxi-
mately half the years during that period. Australia has a long history with
no default by the federal or state governments. Australia’s trust was gener-
ated by experiencing several substantial negative external shocks without
defaulting, unlike most Latin American countries.
To conclude: the authors are making a strong case that OS, CM, and DI
are distinct hypotheses, dealing with related but diﬀerent issues. The em-
pirical evaluation of the relative merits of OS, CM, and DI remains debat-
able—there is no clean test that can do the job. The authors’ presumption
underlying the focus on OS—that foreign borrowing is welfare enhanc-
ing—is debatable. Original sin is only one of the distortions EMs grapple
with, and potentially not the most important one. Removing OS, without
dealing with the other distortions, may be welfare reducing.
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